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Abstract—We investigate revenue maximization problems in
auctions for dynamic spectrum access. We consider the frequency
division and spread spectrum methods of dynamic spectrum
sharing. In the frequency division method, a primary spectrum
user allocates portions of spectrum to different secondary users.
In the spread spectrum method, the primary user allocates
transmission powers to each secondary user. In both cases, we
assume that a secondary user’s utility function is linear in the rate
it can achieve by using the available spectrum/power. Assuming
strategic users, we present incentive compatible, individually ra-
tional and revenue-maximizing mechanisms for the two scenarios.
Index Terms—Dynamic Spectrum Access, Spectrum Auctions,
Bayesian Mechanism Design, Revenue maximization.
I. INTRODUCTION
Traditional spectrum allocations are done in a static manner
where long-term spectrum licenses covering large geographi-
cal areas are sold. Under this type of static allocation, there
is increasing evidence that spectrum resources are not being
efficiently utilized [1]. At the same time, wireless devices are
enjoying ever greater capability to detect spectrum availability
and flexibility to adjust their operating frequencies and trans-
mission powers. These observations have led to a push for
dynamic spectrum sharing where the primary user may lease
spectrum/power to secondary users.
Various kinds of auctions have been proposed for the
spectrum sharing problem. In the frequency division method,
the primary spectrum owner partitions its available spectrum
into n sub-bands and a multiple product auction takes place.
Spectrum sharing by frequency devision has been investigated
in [2] and [3]. In [2], the authors use a sequential second price
auction mechanism where each unit is sequentially allocated
using a second-price auction. They study the equilibrium of
such an auction and characterize the resulting efficiency loss.
In [3], the authors consider users with strict spectrum demands
across multiple channels and find revenue-maximizing auc-
tions.
In contrast to the frequency division method of spectrum
sharing, spread spectrum methods allow different secondary
users to use the same spectrum. The users can distribute
power over the available frequency band so as to minimize the
interference they face or to maximize their rates. Such methods
were studied in [4], [5], [6], [7] in a game-theoretic/mechanism
design context.
In this paper, we consider both the frequency division
and spread spectrum methods of spectrum sharing. In the
frequency division method, each secondary user communicates
over its alloted spectrum sub-band. We assume that users
in different sub-bands do not interfere with each other. In
the spread spectrum method, each secondary user spreads its
allotted power uniformly over the entire spectrum. In this case,
different users’ transmissions interfere with each other.
We model the spectrum/power as a perfectly divisible com-
modity that the primary user can divide among the secondary
users and charge payments to the secondary users so as to
maximize its revenue. Since the primary user does not have
complete information about the secondary users’ utilities, it
has to solicit information from them. The allocation process
proceeds as follows: first, the primary user announces a spec-
trum/power allocation rule that maps the private information
reported by the secondary users to spectrum/power allocations.
In addition, the primary user announces a payment rule that
maps the private information reported by the secondary users
to payments to be charged to the secondary users. Once the
secondary users report their private information, the primary
user decides the distribution of spectrum/power and payments
according to the announced allocation and payment rules.
The spectrum/power allocation rule and the payment rule
are collectively referred to as the mechanism chosen by the
spectrum owner.
We assume that the users’ utilities are linear in the expected
rate they can achieve from a given amount of spectrum. We
further assume that a user’s private information is entirely
captured by the slope of this linear relation. We interpret
this slope as a users’ “willingness to pay” for the expected
rate it may get. We model the secondary users as strategic
agents. Thus, once the primary user fixes its allocation and
payment rule, a Bayesian game is played among the users.
The spectrum owner has to find allocation and payment rules
that maximize its revenue while ensuring that truth-telling is
an equilibrium of the induced Bayesian game among the users.
The primary user’s problem belongs to the class of Bayesian
mechanism design. Bayesian mechanism design is a branch of
mathematical economics (see [8], [9], [10], [11] and references
therein). Our work is philosophically similar to Myerson’s
optimal auction ([12]) of an indivisible good. However, since
we assume perfect divisibility of spectrum, our mechanism
differs from the mechanism in [12].
The key difference between the frequency division and
spread spectrum method is the way the secondary users
affect each other’s utility. In the frequency division method,
since secondary users in different spectrum sub-bands do not
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2interfere, a secondary user’s utility depends only on its own
share of the spectrum. On the other hand, in the spread
spectrum method a secondary user’s utility depends not only
on its share of power but also on the power allotted to other
users that interfere with it. This difference in the nature of
the two spectrum sharing methodologies results in different
optimization problems for the revenue-maximizing primary
user.
Contribution of the Paper: We formulate two revenue-
maximization problems associated with spectrum sharing by
means of frequency division and spread spectrum methods
with strategic secondary users. Under the assumption of linear
utilities, we present necessary and sufficient conditions that
an incentive compatible and individually rational mechanism
must satisfy. Further, under a regularity condition, we identify
and interpret solutions for the revenue-maximization problem
in the frequency division and spread spectrum scenarios.
Organization of the Paper: The rest of the paper is organized
as follows. We formulate the primary user’s optimization
problem for the frequency division method in Section II. We
introduce incentive compatibility and individual rationality as
constraints in the primary user’s optimization problem in Sec-
tion II-A. In Section II-C, we characterize necessary and suf-
ficient conditions for a mechanism to satisfy these constraints.
We further provide a candidate solution of the primary user’s
problem, and interpret the proposed mechanism. In Section
III we formulate the primary user’s optimization problem for
the spread spectrum method. In Section III-A we characterize
necessary and sufficient conditions for incentive compatibility
and individual rationality and provide a candidate solution for
the primary user’s problem. We conclude in Section IV.
Notation: The set of users is denoted by N =
{1, 2, · · · , N}. For a vector θ = (θ1, θ2, . . . , θN ), we use
θ−i to refer to (θ1, θ2, . . . , θi−1, θi+1, . . . , θN ). We use the
symbol E for the expectation operator. The subscript used
with E denotes the random variables with respect to which
the expectation is taken.
II. FREQUENCY DIVISION METHOD
We consider a spectrum market with a primary spectrum
owner (seller) that owns W Hz of bandwidth and N potential
secondary users (buyers). We assume a frequency division
multiplexing model for spectrum sharing, that is, the seller
can divide the available spectrum into different sub-bands and
allocate them to different users. We assume the spectrum is
a perfectly divisible commodity and the size of sub-band for
each user is decided by the seller. We now explain various
components of our model in detail:
1) The users: We assume each user is a distinct transmitter-
receiver pair that can communicate over a channel with
Gaussian noise. If user i receives x Hz of bandwidth and
its channel gain is hii, then it gets a rate given as:
R(x) = x log
(
1 +
hiiP
N0x
)
(1)
We assume that at the time of spectrum allocation, users
and the seller only have probabilistic information about
the channel gains. That is, for each user i, the channel
gain hii is a random variable with density (or PMF) gi.
The density gi is common knowledge among the users
and the seller. Thus, if user i receives x Hz of bandwidth,
its expected rate is given as
ψi(x) =
∫
x log
(
1 +
hiiP
N0x
)
gi(hii)dhii (2)
We assume that the integral in (2) is well-defined for all
0 ≤ x ≤W .
Further, we assume that a user’s utility is characterized by
a single real number θi. We call θi user i’s type. If user
i has type θi, its utility from getting x Hz of bandwidth
and paying t amount of money is given as:
ui(x, t, θi) = θiψi(x)− t (3)
In other words, a user’s utility is linear in the expected
rate and the monetary payment. We can interpret θi as
user i’s “willingness to pay” - it is the maximum price
per unit of expected rate that the user is willing to pay.
We assume that θi, i ∈ N are independent random
variables; We assume that for each user i, θi is private
information, that is, only user i knows the true value of
its type; We assume that θi ∈ Θi := [θmini , θmaxi ] and the
sets Θi are common knowledge. All users other than user
i and the seller have a prior probability density function
fi(·) (with the corresponding CDF being Fi(·)) on θi;
we assume that fi(θi) > 0, for θi ∈ [θmini , θmaxi ]. We
assume that these densities are common knowledge. We
define θ := (θ1, θ2, . . . , θN ) and Θ := ×Ni=1[θmini , θmaxi ].
2) The Seller: We assume that the seller knows the distribu-
tions gi of each user’s channel gain and the distributions
fi of each user’s type. We define f(θ) =
∏N
i=1 fi(θi)
and f(θ−i) =
∏
j 6=i fj(θj). We assume that the seller’s
utility is the total money he gets from the users.
3) The Mechanism: The seller announces an allocation rule
q = (q1, q2, · · · , qN ) and a payment rule
t = (t1, t2, · · · , tN ),
qi : Θ→ [0,W ] for i = 1, 2, · · · , N, (4)
ti : Θ→ R+ for i = 1, 2, · · · , N. (5)
Definition 1: The mechanism (q, t) is feasible if∑N
i=1 qi(θ) ≤W .
The seller asks the users to report their types. If the type
vector reported is θ, qi(θ) is the amount of spectrum given
to user i and ti(θ) is the payment charged to user i.
Once the mechanism (q, t) has been announced, it in-
duces a Bayesian game among the users. Each user ob-
serves his own type but has only a probability distribution
on other players’ types. A user can report any type (not
necessarily its true type) if it expects a higher utility by
mis-reporting.
A. Incentive Compatibility and Individual Rationality
We define the following properties for a mechanism.
31) Incentive Compatibility: A mechanism (q, t) is said to be
incentive compatible if for each i ∈ N and θi ∈ Θi, we
have
Eθ−i [θiψi(qi(θ))− ti(θ)]
≥ Eθ−i [θiψi(qi(ri, θ−i))− ti(ri, θ−i)] ∀ ri ∈ Θi.
(6)
Incentive compatibility guarantees that truthful reporting
is a Bayesian Nash equilibrium for the game induced
by the mechanism. That is, each user prefers truthful
reporting to any other strategy given that all other users
are truthful.
2) Individual Rationality: A mechanism (q, t) is said to be
individually rational if for each i ∈ N and θi ∈ Θi, we
have
Eθ−i [θiψi(qi(θ))− ti(θ)] ≥ 0. (7)
Individual rationality guarantees that at the truthful
Bayesian Nash equilibrium, each user has a utility no less
than that obtained by not participating in the spectrum
allocation process at all.
In our search for finding the revenue-maximizing mecha-
nism, we will restrict to the class of mechanisms that are
incentive compatible and individual rational. The revelation
principle for Bayesian mechanism design ([12]) ensures that
any spectrum allocation and payments achieved at an equilib-
rium of a Bayesian game of any mechanism can be achieved
by an incentive compatible mechanism. Thus, restricting to
incentive compatible mechanism incurs no loss of revenue.
We impose individual rationality as a natural requirement for
a mechanism that induces players to voluntarily participate in
the mechanism.
B. Revenue Maximization
We have the following problem for the seller.
Problem 1: The sellers’s optimization problem is to choose
a feasible mechanism (q, t) that satisfies equations (6) and (7)
and maximizes his expected revenue given as:
Eθ{
N∑
i=1
ti(θ)}
C. Analysis
We start with the following lemma for the function ψ
defined in (2).
Lemma 1: The function ψ(x) is non-decreasing and con-
cave in x.
Proof: See Appendix A
1) Characterizing Incentive Compatibility and Individual
Rationality: In this Section, we derive necessary and sufficient
conditions for a mechanism to be incentive compatible and
individually rational. Let (q, t) be any feasible mechanism
selected by the seller. In order to characterize incentive com-
patibility and individual rationality for user i, we will adopt
user i’s perspective. Let θi be the user i’s type. User i knows
his own type. However, when the seller asks the user to report
his type, he may report any type ri between θmini and θ
max
i .
We define the following functions:
Definition 2: Given a mechanism (q, t), we define for each
θi, ri ∈ Θi,
Qi(ri) := Eθ−i [ψi(qi(ri, θ−i))], (8)
Ti(ri) := Eθ−i [ti(ri, θ−i)], (9)
Ui(θi, ri) := θiQi(ri)− Ti(ri). (10)
Qi(ri) is the expected rate under the given mechanism that
user i will get if he reports ri while all other users report
truthfully. Note that the expectation is over the type of all other
users θ−i. Similarly, Ti(ri) is the expected payment that user
i will pay when it reports ri. Also, Ui(θi, ri) is the expected
utility for user i if its type is θi and it reports ri.
We can re-write the incentive compatibility and individual
rationality constraints for user i in terms of the functions
defined above.
Incentive Compatibility for user i:
Ui(θi, θi) ≥ Ui(θi, ri), θi, ri ∈ Θi
⇐⇒ θiQi(θi)− Ti(θi) ≥ θiQi(ri)− Ti(ri), θi, ri ∈ Θi
Individual Rationality for user i:
Ui(θi, θi) ≥ 0, θi ∈ Θi
⇐⇒ θiQi(θi)− Ti(θi) ≥ 0, θi ∈ Θi
We can now characterize incentive compatibility and individ-
ual rationality by the following theorem.
Theorem 1: A mechanism (q, t) is incentive compatible and
individually rational if and only if Qi(ri) is non-decreasing in
ri and
Ti(ri) = Ki + riQi(ri)−
∫ ri
θmini
Qi(s)ds, (11)
where Ki = (Ti(θmini )− θmini Qi(θmini )) ≤ 0.
Proof: See Appendix B
2) The Seller’s Optimization Problem: The seller’s objec-
tive can be written as:
N∑
i=1
Eθ{ti(θ)} =
N∑
i=1
Eθi [Eθ−it(θi, θ−i)]
=
N∑
i=1
Eθi [Ti(θi)] (12)
Further, because of Theorem 1, for any incentive compatible
and individually rational mechanism, we can write each term
in the summation in (12) as
Eθi [Ti(θi)]
= Eθi [Ki + θiQi(θi)−
∫ θi
θmini
Qi(s)ds]
= Ki
+
∫ θmaxi
θmini
[
θiQi(θi)−
∫ θi
θmini
Qi(s)ds
]
fi(θi)dθi (13)
4The integral in (13) can be written as:∫ θmaxi
θmini
θiQi(θi)fi(θi)dθi −
∫ θmaxi
θmini
∫ θi
θmini
Qi(s)dsfi(θi)dθi
=
∫ θmaxi
θmini
θiQi(θi)fi(θi)dθi −
∫ θmaxi
θmini
Qi(s)
∫ θmaxi
s
fi(θi)dθids
=
∫ θmaxi
θmini
θiQi(θi)fi(θi)dθi −
∫ θmaxi
θmini
Qi(s)(1− Fi(s))ds
(14)
Using the definition of Qi(·) from (8) in (14), we can write
the right hand side of (14) as∫ θmaxi
θmini
θi
∫
Θ−i
ψi(qi(θi, θ−i))f−i(θ−i)dθ−if(θi)dθi
−
∫ θmaxi
θmini
∫
Θ−i
ψi(qi(s, θ−i))f−i(θ−i)dθ−i(1− Fi(s))ds
=
∫
Θ
θiψi(qi(θ))f(θ)dθ
−
∫ θmaxi
θmini
∫
Θ−i
ψi(qi(s, θ−i))f−i(θ−i)dθ−i
(1− Fi(s))
fi(s)
fi(s)ds
=
∫
Θ
θiψi(qi(θ))f(θ)dθ
−
∫
Θ
ψi(qi(θ))
(1− Fi(θi))
fi(θi)
f(θ)dθ
=
∫
Θ
[
ψi(qi(θ))
(
θi − 1− Fi(θi)
fi(θi)
)]
f(θ)dθ (15)
In the economics literature the term
(
θi − 1−Fi(θi)fi(θi)
)
appearing
in the integral in (15) is called virtual type.
Using (12), (13) and (15), we can write the total expected
revenue as:
N∑
i=1
Ki
+
N∑
i=1
∫
Θ
[
ψi(qi(θ))
(
θi − 1− Fi(θi)
fi(θi)
)]
f(θ)dθ (16)
A feasible mechanism (q, t) for which Ki = 0, i ∈ N (recall
that Ki ≤ 0) and which maximizes
N∑
i=1
∫
Θ
[
ψi(qi(θ))
(
θi − 1− Fi(θi)
fi(θi)
)]
f(θ)dθ
=
∫
Θ
N∑
i=1
[
ψi(qi(θ))
(
θi − 1− Fi(θi)
fi(θi)
)]
f(θ)dθ (17)
while satisfying the conditions of Theorem 1 will be a revenue-
maximizing, incentive compatible and individually rational
mechanism.
3) A Regularity Condition and A Candidate Solution: We
impose the following assumption on the virtual type of each
user which is often called regularity condition.
Assumption 1: For each user i,
(
θi − 1−Fi(θi)fi(θi)
)
is increasing
in θi.
This assumption is satisfied if fi(θi) is non-decreasing. For
instance, the uniform distribution satisfies the assumption.
We can now propose a candidate solution for the seller.
Theorem 2: For each θ ∈ Θ, let qi(θ), i = 1, 2, . . . , N be
the solution of the following optimization problem:
arg max
x
N∑
i=1
{
ψi(xi)
(
θi − 1− Fi(θi)
fi(θi)
)}
subject to
N∑
i=1
xi ≤W. (18)
and let ti(θ), i = 1, 2, . . . , N be given as:
ti(θ) = θiψi(qi(θ))−
∫ θi
θmini
ψi(qi(s, θ−i))ds. (19)
Then, (q, t) is an incentive compatible and individually rational
mechanism that maximizes the seller’s expected revenue.
Proof: By definition, qi(θ), i = 1, 2, . . . , N achieves
the maximum value of
∑N
i=1
[
ψi(qi(θ))
(
θi − 1−Fi(θi)fi(θi)
)]
for
each θ. Hence it maximizes the integral in (17).
We will now show that (q, t) satisfies the characterization
of incentive compatibility and individual rationality in
Theorem 1 with Ki = 0.
Recall that
Ti(ri) = Eθ−i [ti(ri, θ−i)] (20)
Using the equation for ti from Theorem 2, we get
Ti(ri) = ri
∫
Θ−i
ψi(qi(ri, θ−i))f−i(θ−i)dθ−i
−
∫
Θ−i
∫ θi
θmini
ψi(qi(s, θ−i))dsf−i(θ−i)dθ−i
= θiQi(ri)−
∫ θi
θmini
Qi(s)ds (21)
Thus, Ti(·) satisfies (11) of Theorem 1 with Ki = 0.
We will now show that for each θ−i, ψi(qi(θi, θ−i)) is
non-decreasing in θi. This, when averaged over θ−i, will
imply monotonicity of Qi(·). Consider any value of θ−i. Let
wi(θi) :=
(
θi − 1−Fi(θi)fi(θi)
)
. By assumption, wi(θi) is increas-
ing in θi. Let a, b ∈ Θi with a < b. Let (xa1 , xa2 , . . . , xaN )
and (xb1, x
b
2, . . . , x
b
N ) be the solutions for the optimization
problem (18) with θi = a and b respectively. Then, we have
that qi(a, θ−i) = xai and qi(b, θ−i) = x
b
i . Optimality of
(xa1 , x
a
2 , . . . , x
a
N ) in (18) implies that
ψi(x
a
i )wi(a) +
∑
j 6=i ψj(x
a
j )wj(θj)
≥ ψi(xbi )wi(a) +
∑
j 6=i ψj(x
b
j)wj(θj) (22)
Similarly,
ψi(x
b
i )wi(b) +
∑
j 6=i ψj(x
b
j)wj(θj)
≥ ψi(xai )wi(b) +
∑
j 6=i ψj(x
a
j )wj(θj) (23)
Summing (22) and (23) and rearranging terms we obtain
ψi(x
b
i )(wi(b)− wi(a)) ≥ ψi(xai )(wi(b)− wi(a)) (24)
5Since by Assumption 1 (wi(b) − wi(a)) > 0, (24) implies
ψi(x
b
i ) ≥ ψi(xai ). That is,
ψi(qi(b, θ−i)) ≥ ψi(qi(a, θ−i))
This establishes the non-decreasing property of ψi(qi(θi, θ−i))
in θi.
Theorem 2 thus identifies a mechanism that solves the
seller’s optimization problem. Note that for each θ, finding
the allocated spectrum for each user involves solving the opti-
mization problem in (18). We now show that this optimization
is a convex optimization problem.
Lemma 2: The optimization problem in (18) is a convex-
optimization problem.
Proof: We know from Lemma 1 that ψi(xi) is a concave
function of xi. However, the objective in the (18) may not
be concave since for some i, ψi(xi) may be weighted by
a negative multiplier wi(θi) :=
(
θi − 1−Fi(θi)fi(θi)
)
. If this
multiplier is negative, then the objective function is maximized
by choosing xi = 0 since ψi(0) = 0. Thus, the objective
function in (18) can be replaced by∑
i:wi(θi)≥0
ψi(xi)wi(θi)
This is now a concave function of xi, i = 1, 2, . . . , N . Hence,
the maximization in (18) is equivalent to a convex optimization
problem.
4) Interpretation/Discussion of the Mechanism: An omni-
scient seller who knew the users’ type could have charged each
user the maximum price that user was willing to pay. Thus,
given an allocation rule q, an omniscient observer could have
obtained a tax amount equal to θiψi(qi(θ)) from user i when
the type realization was θ. Our less informed seller, however,
has to provide a subsidy of
∫ θi
θmini
ψi(qi(s, θ−i))ds to user i,
i ∈ N to ensure that user i reveals its true type.
The tax paid by a user can be more intuitively explained
using the following function:
Zi(y, θ−i) := inf{s ∈ Θi|ψi(qi(s, θ−i)) ≥ y}
Thus, Zi(y, θ−i) is the minimum willingness to pay that user
i should report in order to get at least y amount of rate when
other users type is θ−i. We also define the bandwidth that user
i will obtain by reporting his type to be θmini as
qmini (θ−i) := qi(θ
min
i , θ−i)
Note that if ψi(qi(s, θ−i)) is a one to one function of s, then
for y in the range of this function, Zi(y, θ−i) = s if and only
if ψi(qi(s, θ−i)) = y. The tax function for user i is given as:
ti(θ) = θiψi(qi(θ))−
∫ θi
θmini
ψi(qi(s, θ−i))ds (25)
Figure 1 shows the variation of user i’s expected rate as a
function of its type for a given θ−i. The tax paid by user i
is equal to the area bounded by vertical lines at 0 and θi and
horizontal lines at 0 and ψi(qi(θi, θ−i)) minus the area under
θiθmini
ψi(q
min
i (θ−i))
ψi(qi(θi, θ−i))
Buyer i’s type
Expected Rate
for buyer i
0
Fig. 1. Expected rate for user i vs. user i’s type for a fixed θ−i
the expected rate-type curve. An alternative evaluation of this
area can be obtained by the following expression:
ti(θ) = θ
min
i ψi(q
min
i (θ−i)) +
∫ ψi(qi(θ))
ψi(qmini (θ−i))
Zi(y, θ−i)dy.
(26)
Thus, each user pays a base amount of θmini ψi(q
min
i (θ−i)).
In addition, for each infinitesimal increment in rate from y
to y + dy, the user is charged the minimum price that would
obtain the rate y when other users have types θ−i.
5) Computational Aspects: On receiving the types from the
users, the seller needs to solve a convex optimization problem
to find the optimal allocations according to the mechanism
in Theorem 2. Efficient computational methods are well-
known for such computational problems. The computational
bottleneck in the mechanism of Theorem 2 comes from the
tax equation. In order to evaluate the tax for the user i, th
seller needs to evaluate the integral
∫ θi
θmini
ψi(qi(s, θ−i))ds. To
evaluate the integral, we need to know the allocation qi(s, θ−i)
for all θmini ≤ s ≤ θi. Thus, the seller has to solve a series
of convex optimization problems. In practice, the integral may
be approximated by a Riemann sum, so that the seller has to
solve a finite number of optimization problems.
A consequence of approximating the tax function is that the
seller can only guarantee approximate incentive compatibility
and approximate individual rationality. In other words, if the
seller calculates an under-approximation of the tax to within
 of the correct value, it can guarantee that users cannot
increasing their utility by more than  if they misreport their
type or choose not to participate in the spectrum allocation
process.
III. SPREAD SPECTRUM METHOD
In this Section, we extend the approach and analysis of
Section II to address the spread spectrum method of spectrum
sharing. Here, the primary user can distribute a fixed amount of
power among the secondary users. We assume that the users
spread their alloted power equally over the entire spectrum
band. Let Ptotal be the total power that can be distributed and
6N = {1, 2, · · · , N} be the set of secondary users. We now
explain various components of our model in detail:
1) The users: We assume that each user is a distinct
transmitter-receiver pair. Let P = (P1, P2, . . . , PN ) be
the vector of power allocations for the N secondary
users. For i, j ∈ N , let hij be the channel gain between
transmitter i and receiver j. Then, the rate achieved by
user i is given as:
ψ˜i(P) = Wlog
(
1 +
hiiPi
N0W +
∑
j 6=i hjiPj
)
, (27)
where W is the spectrum bandwidth. Note that due to
interference among the users, the rate achieved by user
i depends on the power allocations to all the users. We
assume that all channel gains are fixed and known to all
users and the spectrum owner.
As in Section II, a user’s utility is characterized by its
type θi. If user i has type θi, its utility from the power
profile P and paying t amount of money is given as:
ui(P, t, θi) = θiψ˜i(P)− t (28)
We assume that θi, i ∈ N are independent random
variables; We assume that for each user i, θi is private
information; We assume that θi ∈ Θi := [θmini , θmaxi ].
All users other than user i and the seller have a prior
probability density function fi(·) (with the corresponding
CDF being Fi(·)) on θi; we assume that fi(θi) > 0,
for θi ∈ [θmini , θmaxi ]. We assume that the densities
fi(·), i = 1, 2, · · · , N, are common knowledge.
2) The Seller: We assume that the seller knows all the
channel gains and the distribution fi, i = 1, 2, · · · , N,
of each user’s type. We assume that the seller’s utility is
the total money he gets from the users.
3) The Mechanism: The seller announces an allocation rule
q = (q1, q2, · · · , qN ) and a payment rule
t = (t1, t2, · · · , tN ),
qi : Θ→ [0, Ptotal] for i = 1, 2, · · · , N, (29)
ti : Θ→ R+ for i = 1, 2, · · · , N, (30)
Definition 3: The mechanism (q, t) is feasible if∑N
i=1 qi(θ) ≤ Ptotal.
The seller asks the users to report their types. If the type
vector reported is θ, qi(θ) is the amount of power given
to user i and ti(θ) is the payment charged to user i. We
denote by q1:N (θ) the N-tuple (q1(θ), q2(θ), . . . , qN (θ))
We can now define incentive compatibility and individual
rationality:
1) Incentive Compatibility: A mechanism (q, t) is said to be
incentive compatible if for each i ∈ N and θi ∈ Θi, we
have
Eθ−i
[
θiψ˜i(q1:N (θ))− ti(θ)
]
≥ Eθ−i
[
θiψ˜i(q1:N (ri, θ−i))− ti(ri, θ−i)
]
∀ ri ∈ Θi.
(31)
2) Individual Rationality: A mechanism (q, t) is said to be
individually rational if for each i ∈ N and θi ∈ Θi, we
have
Eθ−i
[
θiψ˜i(q1:N (θ))− ti(θ)
]
≥ 0. (32)
We have the following problem for the seller.
Problem 2: The sellers’s optimization problem is to choose
a feasible mechanism (q, t) that satisfies equations (31) and
(32) and maximizes his expected revenue given as:
Eθ{
N∑
i=1
ti(θ)}
A. Analysis
1) Characterizing Incentive Compatibility and Individual
Rationality: In this Section, similarly to section II-C, we
derive necessary and sufficient conditions for a mechanism to
be incentive compatible and individually rational. Let (q, t) be
any mechanism selected by the seller. In order to characterize
incentive compatibility and individual rationality for user i,
we will adopt user i’s perspective. Let θi be the type of user
i. User i knows his own type. However, when the seller asks
the user to report his type, he may report any type ri between
θmini and θ
max
i . We define the following functions:
Definition 4: Given a mechanism (q, t), we define for each
ri ∈ Θi,
Q˜i(ri) := Eθ−i [ψ˜i(q1:N (ri, θ−i))] (33)
Ti(ri) := Eθ−i [ti(ri, θ−i)], (34)
Ui(θi, ri) := θiQ˜i(ri)− Ti(ri). (35)
Q˜i(ri) is the expected rate under the given mechanism that
user i will get if he reports ri while all other users report
truthfully. Similarly, Ti(ri) is the expected payment that user
i will make when it reports ri. Also, Ui(θi, ri) is the expected
utility for user i if its type is θi and it reports ri.
We can now characterize incentive compatibility and indi-
vidual rationality by the following theorem.
Theorem 3: A mechanism (q, t) is incentive compatible and
individually rational if and only if Q˜i(ri) is non-decreasing in
ri and
Ti(ri) = Ki + riQ˜i(ri)−
∫ ri
θmini
Q˜i(s)ds, (36)
where Ki = (Ti(θmini )− θmini Q˜i(θmini )) ≤ 0.
Proof: The proof follows the same arguments as the proof
of Theorem 1.
2) Seller’s Optimization Problem: The seller’s objective
can be written as:
N∑
i=1
Eθ{ti(θ)} =
N∑
i=1
Eθi [Eθ−it(θi, θ−i)]
=
N∑
i=1
Eθi [Ti(θi)] (37)
7Further, because of Theorem 3, for any incentive compatible
and individually rational mechanism, we can write each term
in the summation in (12) as
Eθi [Ti(θi)]
= Eθi [Ki + θiQ˜i(θi)−
∫ θi
θmini
Q˜i(s)ds]
= Ki
+
∫ θmaxi
θmini
[
θiQ˜i(θi)−
∫ θi
θmini
Q˜i(s)ds
]
fi(θi)dθi (38)
Now, by following similar arguments as in section II-C2,
we can write the total expected revenue as:
N∑
i=1
Ki
+
N∑
i=1
∫
Θ
[
ψ˜i(qi:N (θ))
(
θi − 1− Fi(θi)
fi(θi)
)]
f(θ)dθ (39)
A feasible mechanism (q, t) for which Ki = 0, i ∈ N (recall
that Ki ≤ 0) and which maximizes
N∑
i=1
∫
Θ
[
ψ˜i(qi:N (θ))
(
θi − 1− Fi(θi)
fi(θi)
)]
f(θ)dθ
=
∫
Θ
N∑
i=1
[
ψ˜i(qi:N (θ))
(
θi − 1− Fi(θi)
fi(θi)
)]
f(θ)dθ (40)
while satisfying the conditions of Theorem 3 will be a revenue-
maximizing, incentive compatible and individually rational
mechanism.
We can now propose a candidate solution for the seller.
Theorem 4: For each θ ∈ Θ, let qi(θ), i = 1, 2, . . . , N be
the solution of the following optimization problem:
arg max
x1:N
N∑
i=1
{
ψ˜i(x1:N )
(
θi − 1− Fi(θi)
fi(θi)
)}
subject to
N∑
i=1
xi ≤ Ptotal, (41)
where x1:N = (x1, x2, · · · , xN ), and let ti(θ), i = 1, 2, . . . , N
be given as:
ti(θ) = θiψ˜i(q1:N (θ))−
∫ θi
θmini
ψ˜i(q1:N (s, θ−i))ds. (42)
Then, if the regularity condition of Assumption 1 is true, (q, t)
is an incentive compatible and individually rational mechanism
that maximizes the seller’s expected revenue.
Proof: See Appendix C.
Theorem 4 thus identifies a mechanism that solves the
seller’s optimization problem. Note that for each θ, finding
the allocated spectrum for each user involves solving the
optimization problem in (18).
The mechanism proposed in Theorem 4 for the spread
spectrum problem can be interpreted in a manner similar
to the one presented in section II-C4. However, solving the
optimization problem in (41) is computationally more difficult
than (18), because of the following reasons:
• ψi(.) is a concave function, but ψ˜i(.) is not necessarily
concave.
• ψi(.) is a one variable function in comparison to ψ˜i(.)
which is multi-variable.
Numerical solution of the optimization problem in (41)
would require algorithmic techniques and approximations for
non-convex optimization problems, [13].
IV. CONCLUSIONS
We considered the frequency division and spread spectrum
methods of spectrum sharing. We derived incentive compati-
ble, individually rational and revenue maximizing mechanisms
for a primary user that can allocate spectrum/power to sec-
ondary users and charge them payments. We assumed that the
secondary users are strategic and that the secondary users’
private informations (types) are independent random variables
with densities that are common knowledge among the primary
and the secondary users.
The linear relationship between a secondary user’s utility
and the expected rate it can achieve is a critical assumption
of our analysis. This allowed us to completely characterize a
user’s private information by a single parameter θi. The char-
acterization of incentive compatible and individually rational
mechanism obtained in Theorem 1 and Theorem 3 is critically
dependent on the uni-dimensionality of each user’s private
information as captured by its type θi. Revenue maximizing
mechanisms with general models of users’ utilities and multi-
dimensional private information remain an open problem.
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APPENDIX A
PROOF OF LEMMA 1
Consider the function ψ(·) defined in (2). Then,
ψ′(x) =
∫ [
log(1 +
hiiP
N0x
)
− hiiP
N0x+ hiiP
]
g(hii)dhii, (43)
ψ′′(x) =
∫ [
− hiiP
(hiiP +N0x)x
+
hiiPN0
(hiiP +N0x)2
]
g(hii)dhii (44)
=
∫ [
− (hiiP )
2
(hiiP +N0x)2x
]
g(hii)dhii
≤ 0 (45)
Equation (45) establishes the concavity of ψ(x). Further, by
(43), ψ′i(0) = +∞ and limx→∞ ψ′(x) = 0. This combined
with the fact that ψ′(x) is a non-increasing function (because
of ψ′′(x) ≤ 0 ), implies that ψ′(x) > 0, for x ≥ 0. Thus,
ψ(x) is a non-decreasing function of x.
APPENDIX B
PROOF OF THEOREM 1
Sufficiency: First assume that (q, t) is a mechanism for
which Qi(ri) is non-decreasing in ri and equation (11) is
true. We will show that (q, t) is incentive compatible and
individually rational for user i. For any θi ∈ Θi, we have
Ui(θi, θi) = θiQi(θi)− Ti(θi)
=
∫ θi
θmini
Qi(s)ds−Ki (46)
≥ 0, (47)
where we used (11) in (46) and the non-negativity of Qi and
of (−Ki) in (47). Thus, (q, t) is individually rational for user
i. Further,
Ui(θi, θi)− Ui(θi, ri)
=
∫ θi
θmini
Qi(s)ds− θiQ(ri) + riQ(ri)
−
∫ ri
θmini
Qi(s)ds (48)
Consider the case when ri < θi. Then, the right hand side of
(48) can be written as∫ θi
ri
[Qi(s)ds]− (θi − ri)Q(ri)
≥ 0, (49)
where we used the non-decreasing nature of Qi in (49).
Similarly, if ri > θi, the right hand side of (48) can be written
as
−
∫ ri
θi
[Qi(s)ds] + (ri − θi)Q(ri)
≥ 0, (50)
which again follows from the non-decreasing nature of Qi.
Thus, we have that
Ui(θi, θi) ≥ Ui(θi, ri),
for all θi, ri ∈ Θi, which establishes incentive compatibility
for user i.
Necessity: Let (q, t) be an incentive compatible and individ-
ually rational mechanism. Let a, b ∈ Θi with a < b. Incentive
compatibility implies that:
aQi(a)− Ti(a) ≥ aQi(b)− Ti(b) (51)
and
bQi(b)− Ti(b) ≥ bQi(a)− Ti(a) (52)
Adding (51) and (52) and rearranging terms we obtain
Qi(b)(b− a) ≥ Qi(a)(b− a) (53)
Since (b − a) > 0, we must have Qi(b) ≥ Qi(a)-which
establishes monotonicity of Qi.
We define Vi(θi) := Ui(θi, θi). That is, Vi(θi) is the
expected utility of user i with type θi under truthful reporting.
Because of incentive compatibility, we have
Vi(θi) = max
ri∈Θi
Ui(θi, ri)
= max
ri∈Θi
{θiQi(ri)− Ti(ri)} ,
which implies that Vi(θi) is the maximum of a family of
affine functions of θi. Thus, Vi(θi) is a convex function and is
differentiable everywhere except for at most countably many
points.
Consider the following limit
lim
δ→0
Vi(θi + δ)− Vi(θi)
δ
≥ lim
δ→0
Ui(θi + δ, θi)− Vi(θi)
δ
= lim
δ→0
(θi + δ)Qi(θi)− Ti(θi)− θiQi(θi) + Ti(θi)
δ
= Qi(θi) (54)
Similarly, we have
lim
δ→0
Vi(θi)− Vi(θi − δ)
δ
≤ lim
δ→0
Vi(θi)− Ui(θi − δ, θi)
δ
= lim
δ→0
θiQi(θi)− Ti(θi)− (θi − δ)Qi(θi) + Ti(θi)
δ
= Qi(θi) (55)
9Equations (54) and (55) imply that V ′i (θi) = Qi(θi). Thus,
for any ri ∈ Θi,
Vi(ri) = Vi(θ
min
i ) +
∫ ri
θimin
Qi(s)ds
=⇒ riQi(ri)− Ti(ri) = θmini Qi(θmini )− Ti(θmini )
+
∫ ri
θmini
Qi(s)ds (56)
Rearranging (56) gives
Ti(ri) =(Ti(θ
min
i )− θmini Qi(θmini ))
+ riQi(ri)−
∫ ri
θmini
Qi(s)ds (57)
Defining Ki = (Ti(θmini ) − θmini Qi(θmini )), we get (11) of
Theorem 1 from (57). Note that individual rationality at θmini
implies that
θmini Qi(θ
min
i )− Ti(θmini ) ≥ 0,
which implies that Ki ≤ 0.
APPENDIX C
PROOF OF THEOREM 4
By definition, qi(θ), i = 1, 2, . . . , N achieves the maxi-
mum value of
∑N
i=1
[
ψ˜i(q1:N (θ))
(
θi − 1−Fi(θi)fi(θi)
)]
for each
θ. Hence it maximizes the integral in (17).
We will now show that (q, t) satisfies the characterization of
incentive compatibility and individual rationality in Theorem 3
with Ki = 0.
Ti(ri) = Eθ−i [ti(ri, θ−i)]
= θi
∫
Θ−i
ψ˜i(q1:N (ri, θ−i))f−i(θ−i)dθ−i
−
∫
Θ−i
∫ θi
θmini
ψ˜i(q1:N (s, θ−i))dsf−i(θ−i)dθ−i
= θiQ˜i(ri)−
∫ θi
θmini
Q˜i(s)ds (58)
Thus, Ti(·) satisfies (36) of Theorem 3 with Ki = 0.
We will now show that for each θ−i, ψ˜i(q1:N (θi, θ−i)) is
non-decreasing in θi. This, when averaged over θ−i, will imply
monotonicity of Q˜i(·).
Consider any value of θ−i. Let wi(θi) :=
(
θi − 1−Fi(θi)fi(θi)
)
. By
assumption, wi(θi) is increasing in θi. Let a, b ∈ Θi with a <
b. Let xa1:N = (x
a
1 , x
a
2 , . . . , x
a
N ) and x
b
1:N = (x
b
1, x
b
2, . . . , x
b
N )
be the solutions for the optimization problem (18) with θi = a
and b respectively. Then, we must have,
ψ˜i(x
a
1:N )wi(a) +
∑
j 6=i ψ˜j(x
a
1:N )wj(θj)
≥ ψ˜i(xb1:N )wi(a) +
∑
j 6=i ψ˜j(x
b
1:N )wj(θj) (59)
Similarly,
ψ˜i(x
b
1:N )wi(b) +
∑
j 6=i ψ˜j(x
b
1:N )wj(θj)
≥ ψ˜i(xa1:N )wi(b) +
∑
j 6=i ψ˜j(x
a
1:N )wj(θj) (60)
Summing (59) and (60) and rearranging terms we obtain
ψ˜i(x
b
1:N )(wi(b)− wi(a)) ≥ ψ˜i(xa1:N )(wi(b)− wi(a)) (61)
Since by Assumption 1 (wi(b) − wi(a)) > 0, (61) implies
ψ˜i(x
b
1:N ) ≥ ψ˜i(xa1:N ). This establishes the monotonicity of
ψ˜i(q1:N (θi, θ−i)) in θi.
